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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 13-2595
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.
DONTE HALL,
Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-12-cr-00176-004)
District Judge: Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno
__________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 11, 2014
Before: CHAGARES, SHWARTZ and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 24, 2014)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Donte Hall appeals a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to 84 months’ imprisonment. Hall’s counsel

moves to withdraw his representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), and has filed a supporting brief. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the
proceedings in this case, we will revisit them only briefly. On February 11, 2013, Hall
pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1), distribution and aiding and abetting the distribution of five
grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)
(Counts 4, 6), and use of a communication facility in furtherance of drug trafficking in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 843(b) (Counts 8, 9, 11-13). With few exceptions, Hall
“voluntarily and expressly waive[d] all rights to appeal” in the plea agreement. App. 47.
During the change of plea hearing, the District Court confirmed Hall’s mental and
physical competence to enter into the plea agreement and his understanding of its
stipulations, including his waiver of the right to a trial by jury and limitation of the issues
he may appeal. The District Court also confirmed that Hall was entering into the guilty
plea voluntarily.
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted the uncontested presentence
report. The District Court then assigned Hall a criminal history category of I based on
Hall’s prior felony drug conviction, and recognized a total offense level of 27. This
corresponds with an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’
imprisonment. The District Court then granted the Government’s motion for a downward
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departure based on Hall’s cooperation in the prosecution of other individuals, bringing
his offense level to 23. The District Court acknowledged that the Sentencing Guidelines
recommend a term of imprisonment between 46 and 57 months for an offense level of 23
and a criminal history category of I.
The District Court then made its own motion for an upward variance. After giving
the Government, Hall’s counsel and Hall a chance to speak, the District Court evaluated
the relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The District Court considered
Hall’s role as a supplier in the methamphetamine conspiracy, the seriousness of the
crime, the need to deter others from committing similar crimes, and the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities. The District Court also considered mitigating factors
including Hall’s education and training, his limited criminal history, and his cooperation
with the Government. Based on these factors, the District Court sentenced Hall to 84
months’ imprisonment, finding this sentence to be “sufficient, but . . . not greater than
necessary.” App. 104. Hall filed a timely appeal. Hall’s counsel moves to withdraw and
has filed an Anders brief indicating that he finds no meritorious issues on appeal.1
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Counsel may file a motion to withdraw and a supporting Anders brief if, after
reviewing the record, counsel is “persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even
arguable merit.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a). In reviewing counsel’s Anders brief, our inquiry
1

Hall did not exercise his option to file a supplemental brief.
3

is twofold. We must determine (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s
requirements, and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any
nonfrivolous issues. United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). Where an
Anders brief appears adequate on its face, we will rely on it to guide our review of the
record. Id. at 301.
III.
Counsel’s Anders brief identifies three potentially appealable issues: (1) whether
the District Court had jurisdiction; (2) whether the guilty plea was valid; and (3) whether
Hall’s sentence was reasonable. For each of these issues, counsel reviews the relevant
law and explains the frivolous nature of the appeal to our satisfaction. Accordingly, we
will rely on the Anders brief to guide our review of the record.
A.
We agree with Hall’s counsel that any challenges to the District Court’s
jurisdiction would be frivolous. Hall did not object to the District Court’s jurisdiction and
explicitly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal on this basis in his plea agreement.
Moreover, as noted above, the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Accordingly, there is no appealable issue of arguable merit as to the District Court’s
jurisdiction.
B.
We also agree with Hall’s counsel that any challenges to the procedural validity or
voluntariness of Hall’s guilty plea would be frivolous. Hall’s plea agreement waives his
ability to appeal on these bases. Moreover, any such appeal would be without merit.
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A criminal defendant’s guilty plea “must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”
United States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 236, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). To ensure that a plea is
knowing and voluntary, the district court must advise a defendant of the consequences of
the plea and ensure that the defendant understands them. United States v. Schweitzer, 454
F.3d 197, 202-203 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) and
Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
Our review of the change of plea hearing transcript confirms that the District
Court conducted a thorough plea colloquy in compliance with Rule 11 and the teachings
of Boykin. The District Court fully explained to Hall the waiver of his constitutional
rights, the charges against him, the maximum possible penalties, the Sentencing
Guidelines recommendations and the District Court’s discretion to depart from them, and
the limitations on Hall’s ability to appeal. The District Court also confirmed Hall’s
mental and physical ability to enter into a plea agreement and verified that Hall was
entering the plea voluntarily. Accordingly, an appeal challenging the procedural validity
or voluntariness of the plea agreement would be wholly frivolous.
C.
Finally, we agree also with Hall’s counsel that any challenges to Hall’s sentencing
would be frivolous. We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of
discretion, which proceeds in two stages of analysis. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). We first review for procedural error, ensuring that the
district court (1) correctly calculated the advisory Guidelines range, (2) ruled on any
formal departure motions, and (3) exercised its discretion in applying the § 3553(a)
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factors. Id. If the sentencing decision passes the first stage of analysis, we then consider
the substantive reasonableness of the decision focusing on the totality of the
circumstances. Id.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court’s sentence was
both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The District Court fully complied with
the governing three-step sentencing process. It correctly calculated the advisory
Guidelines range, granted the Government’s departure motion based on Hall’s
cooperation in the prosecution of others, and examined the § 3553(a) factors. The District
Court explained its reasons for imposing an upward variance by considering Hall’s role
as a supplier in the methamphetamine conspiracy, the seriousness of the crime, the need
for deterrence from similar crimes, and the need to avoid unnecessary sentencing
disparities. The District Court also properly considered the relevant mitigating factors
including Hall’s cooperation with the Government, his minimal criminal record, and his
training and education. Our review of the record, therefore, reveals that the District Court
thoroughly evaluated the § 3553(a) factors and explained its upward variance.
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court committed no procedural errors and any
appeal on this basis would be wholly frivolous.
We also agree that there are no meritorious challenges to the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. A sentence is substantively reasonable unless “no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence . . . for the reasons
the district court provided.” Id. at 568. Although the District Court’s sentence was 27
months above the Guidelines recommendation for Hall’s offense level, “we cannot
6

presume that a sentence is unreasonable simply because it falls outside the advisory
Guidelines range.” Id. at 567. The District Court acted within the bounds of its discretion
in imposing an upward variance to 84 months. See United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d
699, 703, 708 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding an upward variance to 180 months from an
offense level range of 135 to 168 months and an initial base range of 78 to 97 months);
Schweitzer, 454 F.3d at 201-202, 206 (upholding an upward variance to 84 months from
a Guidelines recommended range of 46 to 57 months). Moreover, as indicated above, the
District Court thoroughly discussed the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, we
conclude that the sentence was substantively reasonable and any appeal on this basis
would be frivolous.
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude
that no further discussion is necessary. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court
and grant counsel’s Anders motion.
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